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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken by plaintiff-appellant Melany Zoumadakis ("Zoumadakis") 
from the trial court's grant of the Motion to Dismiss of defendants-appellees Uintah 
Basin Medical Center ("Uintah Basin"), Dr. Mark Mason ("Dr. Mason"), Lloyd Nielson 
("Nielson") and Carolyn Smith ("Smith"). The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of 
this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Defendants-Appellees offer this statement of issues and the standard of review in 
lieu of the one contained in Appellant's Brief because it more accurately characterizes the 
issues presented to the trial court and the standard of review to be applied by this Court. 
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting defendants-appellees' motion to 
dismiss: 
i. Zoumadakis' first cause of action alleging defamation; 
ii. Zoumadakis' second cause of action alleging intentional infliction of 
emotional distress; and 
iii. Zoumadakis' third cause of action alleging interference with employment 
contract. 
a. Standard of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's grant of a motion to 
dismiss for correctness. Hunter v. Sunrise Title Co., 84 P.3d 1163, 1165 (Utah 2004). 
1 
2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to allow Zoumadakis to amend her 
Complaint in lieu of granting defendants-appellees' Motion to Dismiss notwithstanding 
Zoumadakis' failure to seek amendment under Utah R. Civ. P. 15. 
a. Standard of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion 
to amend for abuse of discretion. Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 48 P.3d 895, 909 (Utah 
2002). 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah R. Civil P. 12(b)(6), providing for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arose out of the termination of Zoumadakis' employment with Uintah 
Basin as a home health nurse in September 2003. Zoumadakis filed her Complaint in 
December 2003. In January 2004, defendants-appellees moved to dismiss Zoumadakis' 
Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice. After briefing was complete, the trial court 
heard the Motion to Dismiss on May 10, 2004. On May 24, 2004, the Court entered an 
order granting the Motion to Dismiss. This timely appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because this case involves the review of the trial court's granting of a motion to 
dismiss, the allegations of Zoumadakis' Complaint comprise the relevant "facts." As set 
forth in her Complaint, defendant-appellee Uintah Basin is a small, rural hospital located 
in Roosevelt, Utah. Zoumadakis was employed by Uintah Basin as a home health nurse 
2 
from approximately June 1990 through mid-September 2003. R. 2-3, fflf 5, 7, 14. 
Defendant-appellee Dr. Mason is a doctor who provides services to Uintah Basin 
pursuant to contract, under which Uintah Basin manages his practice. R. 2, f^ 8; R. 47, j^ 
3. Defendant-appellee Nielson is employed by Uintah Basin as the director of Uintah 
Basin's home health department, in which role he supervised Zoumadakis. R. 2, ^J 7, 10; 
R. 47, [^ 4. Defendant-appellee Smith is employed by Uintah Basin and works as a 
medical assistant to Dr. Mason. R. 2, ^ 9; R. 47, f^ 5. 
Zoumadakis alleged that Smith told Dr. Mason that Zoumadakis had questioned 
his care of his patients. R. 2, f^ 9. Zoumadakis alleged that thereafter, Dr. Mason told 
Uintah Basin that (1) Zoumadakis was telling Dr. Mason's patients that he had ordered 
the wrong treatment and was giving improper care, and (2) a patient had complained to 
Dr. Mason that Zoumadakis smelled of alcohol during a home health visit, R. 2, f^ 8. 
Zoumadakis claimed that in response to these statements, Nielson prepared a disciplinary 
report in September 2003 incorporating Dr. Mason's statements. R. 2-3, ^  18. 
Zoumadakis alleged that in September 2003, Nielson showed the disciplinary 
report to Zoumadakis and asked her to sign it. R. 2-3, ^  10-14. When Zoumadakis 
refused to sign the form and accept the discipline, Nielson terminated her employment. 
Id. Zoumadakis also alleged that following her employment, in response to an 
unemployment claim she filed, Nielson told the Utah Department of Workforce Services 
that Zoumadakis quit, as opposed to being fired, and misstated her professionalism and 
work history. R. 6, f 36. 
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In her Complaint, Zoumadakis stated three causes of action against all defendants: 
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress and interference with contract. R. 
4-6. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Following the termination of her employment with Uintah Basin, Zoumadakis 
initiated suit against Uintah Basin and several of its employees and agents alleging 
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress and interference with her contract 
of employment. Defendants-appellees moved to dismiss Zoumadakis' Complaint with 
prejudice because it failed to state a claim under Utah law. The trial court correctly 
dismissed Zoumadakis' defamation claim on several grounds, including failure to plead 
the alleged defamatory statements with sufficient specificity, qualified and absolute 
privilege for the alleged defamatory statements and lack of publication. The trial court 
correctly dismissed Zoumadakis' intentional infliction of emotional distress claim 
because under Utah law, emotional distress suffered by reason of an allegedly incorrect 
or wrongful termination is not sufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction. 
Finally, as Zoumadakis now acknowledges, the trial court correctly dismissed 
Zoumadakis' interference with employment contract claim because, among other reasons, 
she was employed at will. 
On appeal, Zoumadakis's primary argument is that even if her Complaint failed 
to state a claim, the trial court erred by failing to allow her to amend in lieu of dismissing 
her complaint. Zoumadakis makes this argument despite the fact that in the trial court, 
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she failed to avail herself of the options for amending her Complaint under Utah R. Civil 
P. 15. The trial court correctly dismissed her Complaint for failure to state a claim, and 
its decision should be affirmed in all respects. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED ZOUMADAKIS' 
COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO UTAH R. CIVIL P. 12(B)(6). 
A. The Trial Court Correctly Dismissed Zoumadakis' First Cause Of 
Action For Defamation. 
The trial court dismissed Zoumadakis' first cause of action for defamation on the 
grounds (1) she failed to plead her allegations with adequate specificity and (2) the 
alleged defamatory statements were conditionally privileged. R. 97; Appellant's 
Addendum, No. 6. Zoumadakis' defamation claim was based on the following alleged 
communications: 
a. a statement by Smith to Dr. Mason that Zoumadakis had 
questioned his care of his patients; R. 2, *[j 9; 
b. statements by Dr. Mason to Uintah Basin that Zoumadakis 
was telling Dr. Mason's patients that he had ordered the wrong treatment 
and was giving improper care, and that a patient told Dr. Mason that 
Zoumadakis smelled of alcohol during a home health visit; R. 2, Tf 8; and 
c. a written disciplinary report prepared by Nielson that 
addressed the above complaints by Dr. Mason. R. 2-3, ^ | 10, 18. 
In her third cause of action, Zoumadakis also alleged that in response to her claim for 
unemployment, Nielson told the Department of Workforce Services that she quit, and 
was not fired, and misstated her professionalism and work history. 
#180269 vl 
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The elements of a claim for defamation include (1) that defendants published 
statements concerning plaintiff; (2) such statements were false, defamatory and not 
subject to any privilege; (3) such statements were published with the requisite degree of 
fault; and (4) their publication resulted in damage. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 
P.2d 999, 1007 (Utah 1994). Here, the trial court correctly dismissed Zoumadakis' 
defamation claim because (1) she failed to plead her claim with adequate particularity; 
(2) to the extent she adequately plead defamatory statements, the statements of Dr. 
Mason and Smith were subject to a qualified privilege; and (3) with respect to the 
statements attributed to Nielson, such statements were not published, were not 
defamatory or were subject to a qualified privilege. 
1. Zoumadakis' Defamation Claim Was Not Pled With 
Particularity As Required By Utah R. Civil P. 9. 
Utah law requires that defamation claims be pled with particularity. Boisjoly v. 
Morton Thiokol, Inc., 706 F.Supp 795, 799-800 (D. Utah 1988); Williams v. State Farm 
Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982). To meet this requirement, a plaintiff must 
identify the defamatory statement either by its "words or words to that effect;" general 
statements characterizing the defamatory words are inadequate. Id. Courts have also 
required that the complaint allege when, where and to whom the alleged defamatory 
statement was made. Boisjoly, 706 F.Supp. at 800. This level of specificity is required so 
that the court can determine if the complained of statement is defamatory and also so that 
the defendant may formulate a defense. Id. 
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Applying the above standards, Zoumadakis' Complaint failed to state a claim and 
the district court properly dismissed her claim. Although Zoumadakis identified 
generally the type of statements made, she failed to identify when and where such 
statements were allegedly made, and as to Dr. Mason's alleged statements, exactly to 
whom the statements were made. R. 2-3, ^ j 8, 9 and 18. Thus, Zoumadakis' first cause 
of action was properly dismissed. 
2. The Alleged Statements of Smith and Dr. Mason Were Subject 
To A Qualified Privilege. 
The law has long recognized that a publication is conditionally privileged if it is 
made to protect a legitimate interest of the publisher. Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 
49, 58-59 (Utah 1991). The privilege also extends to statements made to advance a 
legitimate common interest between the publisher and the recipient of the publication. 
Id.; Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1983). Here, construing the Complaint in 
a light most favorable to her, Zoumadakis alleged that Smith, Dr. Mason's medical 
assistant, made a defamatory statement to Dr. Mason and Dr. Mason made defamatory 
statements to Uintah Basin regarding Zoumadakis' interaction with Dr. Mason's patients. 
Even accepting the truth of these allegations, Zoumadakis' defamation claim was 
properly dismissed because Smith's alleged statements to Dr. Mason, and Dr. Mason's 
alleged statements to Uintah Basin, were subject to the common interest qualified 
privilege and therefore cannot constitute defamation. Smith works for Dr. Mason as his 
medical assistant. As such, Smith and Dr. Mason have a common interest in the welfare 
of the patients seen by Dr. Mason. Statements by Smith to Dr. Mason regarding 
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Zoumadakis' interaction with and care of Dr. Mason's patients clearly fall within that 
common interest. 
Similarly, given that Dr. Mason is under contract with Uintah Basin and provides 
services to its patients, and Uintah Basin's home health department provides services to 
Dr. Mason's patients, Dr. Mason and Uintah Basin share a common interest in both their 
patients and the care provided to those patients by Uintah Basin personnel. Statements 
by Dr. Mason to Nielson, who directs Uintah Basin's home health division and directly 
supervises Zoumadakis, regarding Zoumadakis' performance of her home health duties 
with Dr. Mason's patients fall within that common interest and within the qualified 
privilege. Brehany, 812 P.2d at 58-59; see also Yu v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 1991 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12722, *14-15 (D. Utah June 11, 1991) (employer-employee 
communications regarding employee discipline matter subject to common interest 
qualified privilege) (A copy of Yu is contained in the Addendum hereto.). 
Zoumadakis claims that dismissal of her defamation claim was error because she 
submitted an affidavit in response to the Motion to Dismiss alleging that Smith's 
statements to Dr. Mason and Dr. Mason's statements to Uintah Basin were made with 
malice, which vitiates the qualified privilege. See Brehany, 812 P.2d at 58 (plaintiff can 
overcome qualified privilege by demonstrating actual malice or over-publication). As an 
initial matter, as she acknowledges, Zoumadakis' allegations of malice were not 
contained in her Complaint. Defendants-appellees sought dismissal of Zoumadakis' 
Complaint under Utah R. Civil P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion addresses the 
sufficiency of the allegations contained in the claim, accepting their truth for purposes of 
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the motion. Zoumadakis cannot supply missing elements of her Complaint by way of an 
affidavit. See e.g. Nester v. Bank One Corp., 224 F.Supp.2d 1344, 1346 (D. Utah 2002) 
(where Rule 12(b)(6) motion addresses only the sufficiency of complaint, it is 
inappropriate to consider an affidavit from plaintiff in connection with the motion).1 
Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed her defamation claim to the extent it rests on the 
statements of Smith and Dr. Mason. 
3. Zoumadakis' Defamation Claim Was Properly Dismissed To 
The Extent It Rests On Statements By Nielson. 
a. Zoumadakis Failed to Allege Publication of Nielson's 
Disciplinary Report. 
Zoumadakis' defamation claim rests in part on a disciplinary report prepared by 
Nielson and presented to Zoumadakis addressing the complaints raised by Dr. Mason. 
To make out a claim for defamation, Zoumadakis must demonstrate that the allegedly 
defamatory statement (i.e., the disciplinary report) was published to third parties. DeBry 
v. Godbe, 992 P.2d 979, 985 (Utah 1999) ("the requirement of publication means that the 
defamatory statement must be communicated to a third person and that the third person 
reads and understands the statement"). However, Zoumadakis alleges only that Nielson 
showed her the disciplinary report; she does not allege that Nielson published the 
disciplinary report to any third party. Because Zoumadakis has failed to establish 
publication by Nielson, a necessary element of a defamation claim, the trial court 
1
 Moreover, the trial court properly disregarded her affidavit because it contained 
conclusions, as opposed to facts, R. 67, % a, (her allegations of malicious intent on the 
part of Smith and Dr. Mason) and to the extent it alleged facts, such facts were based on 
inadmissible hearsay, rather than personal knowledge. R. 67, f b (statements regarding 
Nielson's actions). 
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correctly dismissed her first cause of action to the extent it rests on the disciplinary 
report. 
b. Nielson's Statements To The Utah Department Of 
Workforce Services Were Either Privileged or Not 
Defamatory. 
Zoumadakis also alleged that Nielson defamed her by telling the Department of 
Workforce Services that she quit, rather than that she was fired, and made unspecified 
statements about her professionalism. To the extent Zoumadakis' defamation claim 
rested on these allegations, dismissal was appropriate because any statements by Nielson 
to the Department of Workforce Services are subject to both an absolute and a qualified 
privilege. 
Utah courts recognize an absolute privilege protecting statements made in a 
judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, including administrative proceedings such as 
unemployment proceedings in the Department of Workforce Services. See Price v. 
Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1257 (Utah 1997) (judicial proceedings privilege covers all 
proceedings of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature, including statements made in the course 
of an administrative proceeding). The necessary elements for application of the judicial 
proceeding privilege include (1) the statement must have been made during or in the 
course of a judicial proceeding; (2) the statement must have some reference to the subject 
matter of the proceeding; and (3) the statement must have been made by someone acting 
in the capacity of judge, juror, witness, litigant or counsel. Id, at 1256. Nielson's alleged 
statements to the Department of Workforce Security clearly meet the above test. 
Nielson's statements were made in response to and addressed Zoumadakis' claim for 
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unemployment benefits and, as a representative of Uintah Basin, he was acting as a 
litigant. Furthermore, even if the alleged statements were not covered by the judicial 
proceeding privilege, such statements would be subject to the common interest qualified 
privilege. Yu, 1991 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 12722 at *15 (employer's statements regarding 
reasons for plaintiffs termination made to Job Services in connection with plaintiffs 
unemployment claim were subject to qualified privilege). 
Dismissal was also appropriate because Nielson's alleged statement that 
Zoumadakis quit, and was not fired, was not defamatory. To constitute defamation, a 
statement must impeach an individual's honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation, and 
thereby expose the individual to public hatred, contempt or ridicule. West, 872 P.2d. at 
1008. Simply stating that a person quit his or her job, even if untrue, does not constitute 
defamation as a matter of law. 
Finally, to the extent Zoumadakis' defamation claim rested on her allegation that 
Nielson misstated her professionalism to the Department of Workforce Services, her 
claim was properly dismissed because she failed to identify with particularity the 
statements allegedly made. See Section I.A.I, above. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Dismissed Zoumadakis' Second Cause Of 
Action For Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress, 
Zoumadakis' second cause of action purported to state a claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress against all defendants. The trial court correctly dismissed 
this claim on the ground the alleged conduct did not rise to the level required to state a 
claim under Utah law, and its decision should be affirmed. 
#180269 vl 
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To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Utah law, a 
plaintiff must show: 
(a) that the defendant engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff 
considered outrageous and intolerable in that it offends the generally 
accepted standards of decency and morality (b) with the purpose of 
inflicting emotional distress or where any reasonable person would have 
known that such would result, and (c) that severe emotional distress 
resulted as a direct result of the defendant's conduct. 
Ankers v. Rodman, 995 F.Supp. 1329, 1335 (D. Utah 1997) (quoting Russell v. Thomson 
Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 905 (Utah 1992)). Dismissal of a claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress on a Rule 12 motion is appropriate if all the elements of 
the tort are not alleged or if the alleged conduct on which the claim is based does not rise 
to the level of outrageousness required under Utah law. Boisjoly, 706 F.Supp. at 801-02. 
Here, dismissal of Zoumadakis' intentional infliction claim was correct because, 
as a matter of law, the alleged conduct on which she based her claim does not rise to the 
level of outrageousness required under Utah law. Whether the alleged conduct at issue 
may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery is a 
question of law for the court. Ankers, 995 F.Supp. at 1335. The burden of proving 
outrageous conduct is a heavy one, and liability may be imposed only where the conduct 
is "atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Retherford v. AT & T 
Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 977-78 n.19 (Utah 1992). Conduct which simply 
constitutes an insult or indignity is not actionable. 
Zoumadakis alleged that defendants Dr. Mason and Smith made untrue statements 
to Uintah Basin regarding her work performance in providing services to their patients. 
12 
Such allegations, even if true, hardly rise to the level of "atrocious and utterly 
intolerable" behavior as required to establish a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. The Utah courts have consistently rejected claims for intentional 
infliction that arise out of the alleged wrongful termination of an employee. For example, 
in Larson v. Sysco Corp., 767 P.2d 557 (Utah 1989), plaintiff claimed he had been 
wrongfully terminated, and in addition to a claim for breach of contract, sought recovery 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the 
lower court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs intentional infliction claim, 
stating that "[w]hile termination can be an emotionally distressing event in one's life, 
mere termination alone does not constitute the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress." Id. at 561. 
In Sperber v. Galigher Ash Co., 747 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out 
of an alleged wrongful termination was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim 
under Utah law. As in Larson, the Court found that mere discharge from employment, 
even where plaintiff claimed, as here, that the employer's stated reason for termination 
was incorrect and a pretext, did not state a claim for intentional infliction as a matter of 
law. The Court noted that while every employee who contests a termination decision 
suffers some emotional anguish as a result of the termination, such distress is simply 
insufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, absent facts 
that would independently support such a claim. Id. at 1028-1029. 
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Similarly, in Boisjoly, 706 F.Supp. at 801-02, plaintiff was employed by defendant 
as an engineer and was involved in the manufacturing of certain parts used in the Space 
Shuttle Challenger. After the Challenger exploded, plaintiff testified before a federal 
commission investigating the incident. Although the plaintiff was not ultimately 
terminated, plaintiff claimed that in connection with that investigation, his employer 
discredited him, threatened his job and removed him from the investigation of the 
accident. Again, the court found that under Utah law, such conduct, while not laudable 
or desirable behavior, was not "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as 
to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly 
intolerable in a civilized society.11 Id at 802. See also, Nestor, 224 F.Supp. at 1347 (to 
state a claim for intentional infliction, the alleged conduct must evoke outrage or 
revulsion; it must be more than unreasonable, unkind or unfair); Gudenkaufv. Stauffer 
Communications, Inc., 922 F.Supp. 461, 464 (D. Kan. 1996) (termination for allegedly 
discriminatory reasons is insufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress); Bunker v. City ofOlathe, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3583 (D. Kan. 
February 21, 2001) (demotion and other adverse employment actions for allegedly 
wrongful reasons is insufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress) (A copy of Bunker is included in the Addendum hereto). 
Regardless of its severity, the emotional distress Zoumadakis claims to have 
suffered by reason of Uintah Basin's decision to terminate her employment is not enough 
to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court correctly 
dismissed Zoumadakis' intentional infliction claim and its decision should be affirmed. 
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C. The Trial Court Correctly Dismissed Zoumadakis' Third Cause Of 
Action For Intentional Interference With Contract. 
In her third cause of action, Zoumadakis alleged that defendants tortiously 
interfered with her employment by making the allegedly false statements that are the 
subject of her defamation claim, leading to her termination. Although entitled "tortious 
interference with employment," such a claim does not exist under Utah law. As 
Zoumadakis admits, her claim was essentially a claim for interference with an 
employment contract. To establish a claim for interference with contract, a party must 
show (1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with plaintiffs existing contractual 
relationship; (2) by an improper purpose or for an improper means; (3) causing damage to 
plaintiff. St Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 
1991); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 1982); see also 
Milatz v. Frito-Lay, Inc. 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 599, *8 (10th Cir. January 15, 1997) (a 
claim of tortious interference with an employment relationship requires the existence of a 
valid enforceable contract) (A copy of Milatz is included in the Addendum hereto.); 
latum v. Philip Morrist Inc., 809 F.Supp. 1452, 1468 (W.D. Okla. 1992), affd 16 F.3d 
417 (10th Cir. 1993), cert, denied, 114 S.Ct. 1833 (1994) (same). 
In the trial court, defendants-appellees obtained dismissal of Zoumadakis' 
interference with contract claim on several grounds, including that she was employed at 
will and did not have an enforceable contract with Uintah Basin. R. 98; Appellant's 
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Addendum, No. 6. On appeal, Zoumadakis now acknowledges that she was an at will 
employee and her interference with employment claim was properly dismissed. 
Zoumadakis claims, however, that this Court should remand to give her the opportunity 
to seek to amend her claim to bring a public policy wrongful termination claim. 
However, in the trial court, Zoumadakis failed to take advantage of the legal options 
available to her for amending her Complaint. Zoumadakis cannot wait until she is on 
appeal and then ask this Court to protect her from her own inaction. As set forth in 
section II below, Zoumadakis had ample opportunity to seek amendment below and the 
district court correctly dismissed her complaint. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY FAILING TO ALLOW 
ZOUMADAKIS TO AMEND HER COMPLAINT IN LIEU OF 
DISMISSAL. 
Finally, Zoumadakis argues the trial court erred because it should have allowed 
her to amend her complaint to correct any deficiencies rather than dismissing her claims. 
Here, the trial court did not err in dismissing her claims; rather, Zoumadakis failed to 
seek amendment under Utah R. Civil P. 15. Under Rule 15, a party may amend his or her 
complaint once as a matter of course prior to the filing of a responsive pleading. 
Thereafter, a party may amend with leave of court or the consent of the opposing party. 
9 _ 
The trial court also properly dismissed this claim because Zoumadakis alleged 
interference only by a party to the contract or its employees and agents. See Leigh 
Furniture, 657 P.2d at 301 (a party to the contract cannot be liable for the interference 
with contract); Yu, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12722 at *16 (interference with contract claim 
fails when alleged interferer is agent of the employer). In addition, Zoumadakis failed to 
allege defendants-appellees intentionally interfered with her alleged contract or knew that 
their actions were a necessary consequence thereof. See Mumford v. ITT Commercial 
Finance Corp., 858 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
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A properly filed motion to amend must state specifically the grounds for amendment and 
be accompanied by a memorandum in support and a proposed amended complaint. Utah 
R. Civil P. 7; Holmes, 48 P.2d at 909-910 (motion to amend must be accompanied by a 
memorandum in support and a proposed amended complaint); see also Behrens v. 
Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Utah 1983) (same). Here, Zoumadakis 
failed to seek any of the above remedies for amending her Complaint.3 Rather, 
Zoumadakis mentioned the possibility of amendment only in passing in the conclusion of 
her motion to dismiss and at oral argument.4 
The Utah Supreme Court has made clear under the circumstances presented here, 
the trial court did not err in failing to allow amendment.5 In Holmes Dev., plaintiff did 
not make a motion to amend but, as in this case, simply requested in its opposition to a 
motion to dismiss that the court allow amendment if it determined the complaint was 
insufficient.6 48 P.3d at 909. The court dismissed plaintiffs complaint and denied the 
request to amend. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, stating: 
3
 Whether Zoumadakis could have amended as of course or only with leave of 
court or consent of defendants is irrelevant because she did not attempt to amend by any 
method. 
4
 In her Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Zoumadakis stated that the pleadings 
should be allowed to be amended if necessary, R.63 , and during the argument, 
Zoumadakis stated on one occasion that allowing for an amended complaint would be 
appropriate. Zoumadakis' Opening Brief at 16; R. 110 at 18. 
5
 Here, the trial court did not specifically address the issue of amendment but 
simply granted defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss without providing for 
amendment. 
6
 Unlike this case, in Holmes, the plaintiff at least referred to Rule 15 and cited one 
case addressing the standard for amendment under Rule 15. 48 P.3d at 909. 
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To properly move for leave to amend a complaint, a litigant must file a 
motion that "shall be made in writing, shall state with particularity the 
grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought." Further, a 
motion for leave to amend must be accompanied by a memorandum of 
points and authorities in support, and by a proposed amended complaint. 
# 5fc * * * 
In this case, Holmes never filed an actual motion for leave to amend. 
Further, Holmes's request failed to "state with particularity the grounds" 
upon which it based its motion for leave to amend. Holmes merely cited 
rule 15(a) and noted that leave to amend should be freely given. Holmes 
never articulated a single reason why the trial court should have granted it 
leave to amend and never provided the trial court a proposed amended 
complaint so that the court could determine the changes that Holmes 
intended to make. By relegating its motion to the end of the memoranda 
opposing the motions to dismiss, Holmes's motions did not comply with 
Utah's formal motion practice rules. Simply put, Holmes's abbreviated 
requests for leave to amend its complaint "lacking . . . statements of the 
grounds for amendment and dangling at the end of [its] memorand[a, do] 
not rise to the level of a motion for leave to amend." Therefore, because 
Holmes's motions for leave to amend its complaint were insufficient, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions. 
Id. at 909-910 [citations omitted]. See also Coroles v. Sabey, 79 P.2d 974, 985-986 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2003) (court did not err in denying amendment where plaintiff failed to seek 
amendment as required under rules of civil procedure). 
Here, while Zoumadakis does not explicitly address her failure to seek amendment 
under Rule 15, she suggests reversal and remand of this case to give her an opportunity to 
amend is appropriate because by granting the motion to dismiss, the trial court did not 
give her time to amend her complaint. Appellant's Brief at 16. Zoumadakis had ample 
time for exercising her rights under Rule 15 if she deemed it appropriate. Defendants-
appellees' Motion to Dismiss was filed in January 2004, but not heard until May. 
Zoumadakis could have sought amendment in response to the Motion to Dismiss, or even 
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after she had filed her opposition but before the Motion to Dismiss was heard. Similarly, 
the Motion to Dismiss was heard on May 10, 2004, but the Court did not enter its 
decision granting the Motion to Dismiss until May 24, 2004. R. 97; Appellant's 
Addendum at No. 6. Again, Zoumadakis could have acted under Rule 15 after the 
hearing, but before the trial court's ruling was entered. 
Zoumadakis also suggests her failure to act under Rule 15 should be excused 
because she could not anticipate defendants-appellees' assertion of the qualified privilege 
defense, and she was mistaken as to the at will nature of her employment relationship, 
and its effect on her third cause of action. Again, defendants-appellees raised both the 
qualified privilege and the at will nature of her employment as grounds for dismissal in 
the Motion to Dismiss. Zoumadakis had ample time to pursue amendment under Rule 15 
in response to the Motion to Dismiss. Zoumadakis should not be allowed to ignore the 
procedural options available to her in the trial court, and then seek reversal from this 
Court to protect her from her inaction below. 
The trial court did not err in failing to allow amendment. Its decision dismissing 
Zoumadakis' Complaint should be affirmed in its entirety. 
aiem^Q ui 
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CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons set forth above, defendants-appellees ask the Court to affirm 
the trial court's decision granting their Motion to Dismiss. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ 1 day of January, 2005. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Carolyn Cox 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12722; 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 313; 122 Lab. Cas. 
(CCH) P56,993; 6 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1116 
June 11, 1991, Decided 
June 11, 1991, Filed 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
JUDGES: [*11 
David K. Winder, United States District Judge. 
OPINIONBY: 
WINDER 
OPINION: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter is before the court on cross motions for 
summary judgment. A hearing on these motions was held 
March 12, 1991. Plaintiff was represented by Louise 
T. Knauer. Defendants were represented by Robert A. 
Peterson, Teresa Silcox and Paul E. Pratt. Before the 
hearing, the court considered carefully the memoranda 
and other materials submitted by the parties. Since tak-
ing the matter under advisement, the court has further 
considered the law and facts relating to these motions. 
Now being fully advised, the court renders the following 
memorandum decision and order. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff is a non-white, Chinese-born woman, 
who was fifty-one years of age when she was ter-
minated by defendant Northwest Pipeline Corporation 
("Northwest") on May 16, 1988. Plaintiff was hired 
by Northwest in January 1979 and held the position of 
Office Administrator of the Business Information Center 
at the time of her termination. 
On or about May 6, 1988, defendant Karen 
McPheeters, Northwest's Corporate Librarian, discov-
ered on or in plaintiff's desk a document from the 
Personnel Department listing the degrees, major [*2] 
fields of study and universities attended by Northwest 
employees. Plaintiffs duties as Office Administrator did 
not involve access to any documents generated by the 
personnel department. 
Northwest's Standard Operating Policies and 
Procedures Manual ("SOP Manual"), in effect and 
posted on a bulletin board at the time of plaintiff's em-
ployment, provided as follows: 
Damaging the integrity of, or compromising the confi-
dentiality of corporate information. . . may be cause for 
disciplinary action up to an including discharge. 
SOP No. 12.3006(3)(m) at 1. The SOP Manual further 
provided that 
it should not be inferred from this policy than an em-
ployee can only be discharged for committing violations 
on this list [including compromising the confidentiality 
of corporate information], nor should this policy be con-
strued to alter the Company's rights as an employer at 
will. 
Id. 
McPheeters reported to defendant Juanita 
Reed, Manager of Employee Development and 
Communications, that she had discovered the personnel 
document in plaintiffs possession. The Personnel 
Department then notified defendant Tom O'Keefe, 
Manger of General Services, of the discovery. 
Defendant Howard Finley, plaintiffs [*3] immediate 
supervisor, was out of town at the time. 
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On May 11, 1988, O'Keefe began an investigation 
of the matter. During the investigation, plaintiff admit-
ted the personnel document was in her possession and 
that she had obtained the document from Trent Enser, 
an employee in the Records Department. Plaintiff said 
she had placed the document in her desk drawer because 
it contained an inaccuracy concerning her educational 
background that she wanted corrected. 
Enser admitted to O'Keefe that he had given the 
document to plaintiff. O'Keefe determined that the per-
sonnel document was a confidential personnel record, 
that plaintiff should not have had possession of the 
document and that both plaintiff and Enser had vio-
lated Northwest's policy regarding confidential corpo-
rate records. On May 16, 1988, Northwest terminated 
plaintiff under SOP No. 12.3006(3)(m) for damaging 
the integrity or compromising the confidentiality of cor-
porate information. Enser also was terminated. 
Following plaintiff's termination, Northwest in-
formed Utah Job Services than plaintiff had been ter-
minated for breach of confidentiality, and therefore 
should be denied unemployment compensation. Non-
supervisory Northwest [*4] employees also were in-
formed that plaintiff had been terminated for breach of 
corporate confidentiality. 
During her employment with Northwest, plaintiff 
applied for five positions other than the one she held 
and was not hired for any of them. Plaintiff claims that 
Northwest hired two younger, white American-born fe-
males and three younger, white American-born males 
for these positions. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, de-
positions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In applying this standard, the court 
must construe all facts and reasonable inferences there-
from in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Wright v. Southwestern Bell Tel. 
Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 1991). 
Once the moving party has carried its burden, Rule 
56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the 
pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or [*5] by the 'de-
positions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Gonzales v. Millers Casualty Ins. 
Co., 923 F.2d 1417, 1419 (10th Cir. 1991). nl The non-
moving party must "make a showing sufficient to estab-
lish the existence of an element essential to that party's 
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of 
proof at trial." Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 
S. Ct. 3177, 3186 (1990) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 
U.S. at 322). 
nl The summary judgment motion may be "op-
posed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials 
listed in Rule 56 (c), except the mere pleadings 
themselves." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317,324(1986). 
In considering whether there exi sts a genuine issue of 
material fact, the court does not weigh the evidence but 
instead inquires whether a reasonable [*6] jury, faced 
with the evidence presented, could return a verdict for 
the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Clifton v. Craig, 924 
F2d 182, 183 (10th Cir. 1991). n2 Finally, all material 
facts asserted by the moving party shall be deemed ad-
mitted unless specifically controverted by the opposing 
party. U.S. Ct. D. Utah Civ. R. P. 5(e). 
n2 "The mere existence of a scintilla of evi-
dence in support of the [nonmoving party's] po-
sition will be insufficient." Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). 
DISCUSSION 
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint asserts seven 
causes of action: (1) discriminatory treatment on the ba-
sis of plaintiff s gender, race and national origin in vio-
lation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title 
VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17; (2) discriminatory 
treatment and discharge on the basis of plaintiff's age in 
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
("ADEA"), [*7] 29 U.S.C. 6260b); (3) breach of em-
ployment contract; (4) breach of an implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing; (5) defamation against 
defendants Northwest, Reid and O'Keefe; (6) defama-
tion against defendant McPheeters; and (7) intentional 
interference with contractual relations against defendant 
McPheeters. 
Defendants have moved for summary judgment on 
all claims. Plaintiff has moved for partial summary judg-
ment as to the liability issues on her Title VII, ADEA, 
breach of contract and defamation claims. The court con-
siders each claim in turn. 
A. Title VII and ADEA Claims 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
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792 (1973), the United States Supreme Court defined 
the elements and burdens of proof necessary to establish 
a prima facie case under Title VII. Plaintiff must estab-
lish that she was (1) a member of a protected class, (2) 
adversely affected by defendant's employment decision, 
(3) qualified for the position, and (4) replaced or rejected 
in favor of a person not in a protected class. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. 
Once plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the bur-
den of production shifts to the employer to [*8] ar-
ticulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 
employee's rejection. Id. After the employer presents a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the reason offered is in fact a mere pre-
text for impermissible discrimination. Id. at 804 
Cases brought under ADEA are subject to the same 
requirements of proof as Title VII cases alleging discrim-
inatory treatment. Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 853 
F.2d 768, 770 (10th Cir. 1988). 
Employers defending a Title VII or ADEA claim 
can establish a basis for summary judgment two ways. 
First, the defendant can demonstrate that the plaintiff 
will be unable to establish a prima facie case at trial. 
Howcroft v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 712 F. 
Supp. 1514, 1520 (D. Utah 1989). Alternatively the de-
fendant can demonstrate that the plaintiff cannot carry 
the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimina-
tion, assuming plaintiff has established a prima facie 
case and defendant has presented a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason. Howcroft, 712 F. Supp. at 1520. 
Defendant Northwest contends that even assuming 
plaintiff [*9] has established a prima facie case of dis-
criminatory treatment and discharge, she cannot carry 
the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimina-
tion. On that ground alone, Northwest argues, it is en-
titled to summary judgment. The court disagrees. With 
respect to plaintiff's theory of discriminatory discharge, 
plaintiff has presented evidence that a few years prior 
to plaintiff's termination, a younger, white, native-born 
male who violated company confidentiality policies was 
not terminated. Plaintiff also has presented evidence that 
she was equally or better qualified than the persons se-
lected for the other positions for which she applied and 
was rejected. 
In the court's opinion, this evidence is sufficient to 
raise a factual question about whether Northwest's rea-
sons for failing to promote and for discharging plaintiff 
were pretextual or legitimate. Accordingly, neither de-
fendant Northwest nor plaintiff are entitled to summary 
judgment on the Title VII and ADEA claims. 
B. Breach of Employment Contract 
Plaintiff claims the SOP Manual created an express 
or implied contract that plaintiff be terminated only for 
cause. The presumption under Utah law is that any em-
ployment contract [*10] that contains no specified term 
of duration is terminable at the will of either party. See 
Berube v. Fashion Center, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 
(Utah 1989). This presumption may be rebutted by ev-
idence that certain terms in an employee policy manual 
were implied terms of the contract of employment and 
limited the employer's right to discharge. Berube, 771 
P.2d at 1044. 
Since this case was argued and submitted, the Utah 
Supreme Court has elaborated on the Berube implied 
employment contract theory in the case of Brehany v. 
Nordstrom, Inc., No. 20590 (UtahMay 16, 1991) (1991 
Westlaw 80706). In Brehany, the Utah Supreme Court 
set forth two propositions that must be established by 
employees who claim their at-will status was altered by 
language in employment manuals. First, the employee 
must show that the provisions in the manual limit or 
modify the employer's unfettered right to discharge its 
employees. Brehany, slip op. at 9. Once this burden is 
carried, the employee then must demonstrate that the 
employer violated the terms of the manual. Id. 
If the terms of the employment manual do purport 
to limit the employer's power to [*11] discharge, the 
question of whether they become implied terms of the 
employment contract is primarily a factual issue. Id. The 
proper construction of contractual terms in the first in-
stance, however, is an issue of law to be decided by the 
court, unless the contract terms are ambiguous and raise 
factual issues. Id. "Thus, when it is plain that a manual 
or bulletin does not limit the right to discharge at will, 
the case need not go to a jury." Id. 
Applying the law of Berube and Brehany to this case, 
the court concludes that the SOP Manual plainly did not 
limit Northwest's right to discharge at will, and thus 
defendant was free to discharge plaintiff for any nondis-
criminatory reason. The SOP Manual expressly states 
that "it should not be inferred from this policy that an 
employee can only be discharged for committing viola-
tions on this list, nor should this policy be construed to 
alter the Company's rights as an employer at will." SOP 
Manual No. 12.3006(3)(m) at 1 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff has failed to carry her initial burden of 
demonstrating that the SOP Manual somehow limited or 
modified Northwest's right to discharge her. Northwest 
therefore is entitled [*12] to summary judgment on 
plaintiff's breach of employment contract claim. 
C. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing 
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Plaintiff's claim that defendant breached a duty of 
good faith and fair dealing in discharging her fails as 
a matter of law. Without comment, the Utah Supreme 
Court refused to recognize such a claim in Caldwell v. 
Ford, Bacon & Davis of Utah, Inc., 777 P.2d 483, 485 
(Utah 1989). In Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., No. 20590 
(Utah May 16, 1991), the court again rejected this legal 
theory and this time cleared up any confusion that may 
have surrounded the implied covenant of good faith in 
the employment contract context. Id., slip op. at 7-9. 
The Brehany court explained that the purpose and 
function of the covenant of good faith implied in all 
contracts differs from the purpose and function of the 
so-called covenant of good faith and fair dealing in em-
ployment contracts. The former covenant presumes that 
the parties intended the rights and duties created by the 
contract to be performed and exercised in good faith. 
Brehany, slip op. at 8. The latter covenant, on the other 
hand, acts as a substantive limitation on the [*13] em-
ployer's right to discharge. Id. 
The Brehany court stated that "in the absence of ex-
press terms limiting the right of an employer to discharge 
for any or no reason and in the absence of provisions es-
tablishing procedures by which a discharge should be 
effectuated, it would be inconsistent to hold that an em-
ployer, on the basis of the implied covenant of good 
faith, is bound to a substantive limitation on the em-
ployer's right to discharge." Id. 
Northwest, therefore, is entitled to summary judg-
ment on plaintiff's claim for breach of implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. 
D. Defamation 
Plaintiff claims that defendants Northwest, Reid 
and O'Keefe defamed plaintiff by informing Utah Job 
Services and various Northwest employees that plain-
tiff was terminated for violating the confidentiality of 
company records. Plaintiff further claims that defendant 
McPheeters defamed plaintiff by informing Northwest 
management that McPheeters discovered the personnel 
document on rather than in plaintiff's desk and by in-
forming Northwest employees that plaintiff was termi-
nated for breaching the company confidentiality policy. 
The alleged defamatory statement communicated 
[*14] by McPheeters to the Northwest managers re-
lated solely to the location of the personnel document. 
If, as plaintiff alleges, the location of the document 
was the only untruth, the court finds as a matter of lab 
that the statement could not be defamatory. Whether the 
document was on or in the desk is not determinative. 
Possession, not location, of the document is the critical 
fact for purposes of determining defamatory content, and 
plaintiff does not dispute such possession. 
With respect to McPheeters' statements to Northwest 
employees, the court finds that such communications 
were truthful or privileged. Similarly, the court finds that 
even if the statements of defendants Reid and O'Keefe 
were defamatory per se, such statements also were truth-
ful or privileged, and thus are not actionable. 
A communication between an employer and an em-
ployee is protected by the common interest qualified 
privilege when (1) the statement refers to a matter in 
which the speaker has an interest or duty, (2) the recipi-
ent had a corresponding duty, and (3) the communication 
was made pursuant to that duty. Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 
1276, 1278 (Utah 1983); Sowell v. IML Freight, Inc., 
30 Utah 2d 446, 519 P.2d 884, 885 (1974); [*15] Alford 
v. Utah League of Cities and Towns, 791 P.2d 201, 204 
(Utah App. 1990). 
It is undisputed that any allegedly defamatory state-
ments made by Reid or O'Keefe were communicated 
pursuant to the company investigation of the circum-
stances surrounding plaintiff's possession of the person-
nel document. The recipients of the information, selected 
Northwest employees and Job Service, had a corre-
sponding interest in hearing the information. Similarly, 
McPheeters' statements to co-workers were privileged 
as statements between members of a group with a com-
mon interest. Because there is no evidence that defen-
dants abused the common interest qualified privilege, 
the statements by Reid, O'Keefe and McPheeters are 
not actionable. 
Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary 
judgment on plaintiff's defamation claims against them. 
E. Intentional Interference with Contractual 
Relations 
Plaintiff's final claim is that McPheeters interfered 
with her employment relationship with Northwest by 
searching plaintiff's desk and informing Northwest that 
she discovered the personnel document for the wrongful 
purpose of having plaintiff disciplined or terminated. 
Tortious interference [*16] with contractual rela-
tions, however, requires three actors: two contracting 
parties and a third interfering party. Leigh Furniture 
and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 1982). 
There is no third party when the alleged interferer is an 
agent of the employer, acting within the scope of her 
employment. Fletcher v. Wesley Medical Center, 585 
F. Supp. 1260, 1262-63 (D. Kan. 1984). 
Because the undisputed facts demonstrate that 
McPheeters' allegedly interfering acts were within the 
scope of her employment, such acts are attributable to 
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12722, *16; 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 313; 
122 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P56,993; 6 LE.R. Cas. (BNA) 1116 
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Northwest. Thus, plaintiffs claim fails as a matter of 
law and McPheeters is entitled to summary judgment. 
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, and good cause 
appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is 
granted as to all claims except plaintiff's claims against 
defendant Northwest under Title VII and ADEA. 
2. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is de-
nied. 
3. This order shall suffice as the court's ruling on 
this motion and no further order need be prepared by 
counsel. 
Dated this 11th day of June, 1991. 
TabB 
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DISPOSITION: [*1] Defendants' motion to dismiss 
(Doc. 35) granted; Counts III, IV, and V of Plaintiffs 
complaint dismissed. 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
COUNSEL: For JOHN K BUNKER, plaintiff: Harold 
S. Youngentob, Goodell, Stratton, Edmonds & Palmer, 
Topeka, KS. 
For OLATHE, KANSAS, CITY OF, SUSAN 
SHERMAN, PHILIP J MAJOR, HOWARD 
KANNADY, defendants: Daniel B. Denk, McAnany, 
Van Cleave & Phillips, P.A., Kansas City, KS. 
JUDGES: G. Thomas VanBebber, United States Senior 
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OPINIONBY: G. Thomas VanBebber 
OPINION: 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
Plaintiff John H. Bunker is a former Captain of the City 
of Olathe, Kansas Police Department. He filed this ac-
tion against the City of Olathe, as a public employer; 
Susan Sherman, in her individual capacity and as for-
mer Acting City Manager of the City of Olathe; Philip 
Major, in his individual capacity and as former Chief of 
Police of the City of Olathe; and Howard Kannady, in 
his individual capacity and as former Acting Chief of 
Police of the City of Olathe. Plaintiff brings claims pur-
suant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging unlawful retaliation 
for exercise of his constitutional right of free speech. 
Plaintiff also brings claims pursuant to Kansas state law 
alleging retaliatory [*2] discharge and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. The case is before the court 
on Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's state law 
claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure 
to state claims upon which relief can be granted (Doc. 
35). For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the 
motion. 
I. Standard for Judgment 
Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate 
only when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff 
can prove no set of facts in support of his theory of re-
covery that would entitle him to relief, see Conley v. 
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 
99 (1957), or when an issue of law is dispositive, see 
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326, 104 L. Ed. 2d 
338, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (1989). The court accepts as true 
all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory 
allegations, see Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc., 144 
F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 1998), and all reasonable 
inferences from those facts are viewed in favor of the 
plaintiff, see Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 108 L. 
Ed. 2d 100, 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990). The issue in review-
ing [*3] the sufficiency of a complaint is not whether the 
plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff 
is entitled to offer evidence to support his claims. See 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 40 L. Ed. 2d 
90, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974). 
H. Factual Background nl 
nl The facts contained in this background are 
based solely upon the allegations in Plaintiff's 
complaint. 
Plaintiff was hired by the City of Olathe as a police of-
ficer in 1973. Plaintiff became classified as a Captain 
in 1982. After receiving multiple positive evaluations 
from his superiors, Plaintiff was assigned to command 
the Investigations Division of the Police Department. 
As Commander of the Investigations Division, Plaintiff 
served, among other things, as the primary contact 
person for the Midstates Organized Crime Information 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3583, *3 
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Center (the "MOCIC"). The MOCIC is one of six 
regional projects that form the Regional Information 
Sharing System, which is supported by a federal grant. 
The overall objective [*4] of the six regional projects is 
to enhance the ability of local, state, and federal law 
enforcement agencies to identify, target, and remove 
criminal conspiracies and activities that cross jurisdic-
tional boundaries. To help accomplish this objective, the 
MOCIC provides "a computerized criminal intelligence 
database and intelligence inquiry service . . . and access 
to a telecommunication system." Plaintiffs Complaint 
atP29. 
In late 1997, an employee of the MOCIC named 
Bill Goodrich contacted Plaintiff to inquire about the 
MOCIC telecommunication system. Mr. Goodrich ad-
vised Plaintiff "that his reason for visiting the Olathe 
Police Department was to relay his superior's concern 
that the Department had utilized the [telecommunica-
tion system] 35-40 times in 1997, but had not submitted 
any criminal intelligence into the intelligence database 
during this same time period." Plaintiff's Complaint at 
P34. Some investigative work revealed that the Chief 
of Police, Defendant Major, had made twenty-nine tele-
phone calls using the MOCIC telecommunication sys-
tem, eleven of which were made to a number listed to 
his ex-wife. Plaintiff concluded that Defendant Major 
was likely using the MOCIC [*5] telecommunication 
system for unauthorized personal use. 
Plaintiff met with the Acting City Manager of Olathe, 
Defendant Sherman, to discuss the MOCIC situation. 
Shortly thereafter, an article appeared in an Olathe news-
paper regarding Plaintiffs report to Defendant Sherman 
and Defendant Major's alleged misuse of the MOCIC 
telephone line. Plaintiff did not speak to the Olathe news-
paper or any other media organization concerning either 
his conversation with Defendant Sherman or his suspi-
cions of misuse of the MOCIC telephone line. 
On February 26, 1998, Plaintiff met with the Johnson 
County District Attorney, Paul Morrison, to discuss the 
MOCIC situation. 
On March 3, 1998, Plaintiff received notification that 
Defendant Major had authorized an Internal Affairs 
Investigation against him. According to the notification, 
Plaintiff had "engaged in action disrespectful of other of-
ficers" and "failed to give suitable attention to the per-
formance of his duties." Plaintiff's Complaint at P71. 
Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave pending the 
outcome of the investigation. During the investigation, 
officers searched Plaintiffs desk without his permission. 
On June 29, 1998, Plaintiff [*6] received a letter 
from Defendant Sherman. The letter advised Plaintiff 
that Defendant Sherman had reviewed the results of 
the Internal Affairs Investigation and determined that 
Plaintiff had violated multiple sections of the Olathe 
Police Department Rules and Regulations. As a result, 
Plaintiff was suspended without pay for four weeks and 
placed on one year of disciplinary probation. In accor-
dance with the guidelines of his probation, Plaintiff was 
to have his performance evaluated on a monthly basis 
and to attend employee counseling. 
Plaintiff was reassigned from Commander of 
the Investigations Division to a position in the 
Administration Division entitled Special Projects 
Officer. He experienced grief, shame, embarrassment, 
anger, and disappointment after being transferred to 
this administrative position. Plaintiff found his working 
conditions to be so intolerable that he eventually retired 
early. 
HI. Discussion 
A. Retaliatory Discharge 
In Counts III and IV of his complaint, Plaintiff alleges 
that Defendants demoted and constructively discharged 
him in retaliation for his "whistle-blowing" activities 
concerning Defendant Major's alleged misuse of the 
MOCIC [*7] telecommunication system. Plaintiff com-
plains that such retaliation is in violation of Kansas law, 
which makes it unlawful for an employer to demote or 
terminate an employee in retaliation for good faith re-
porting of serious infractions of rules, regulations, or 
law to either company management or law enforcement 
officials. See Brigham v. Dillon Cos., Inc., 262 Kan. 
12, 935 P.2d 1054, 1059-60 (Kan. 1997); Palmer v. 
Brown, 242 Kan. 893, 752 P.2d 685, 689-90 (Kan. 
1988). Defendants argue that Plaintiff is precluded from 
bringing any claims for retaliatory demotion/discharge 
based upon his whistle-blowing activities, because 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 provides him with an adequate, alterna-
tive remedy. n2 The court agrees. 
n2 Defendants actually argue that Plaintiff is 
"preempted" from bringing any claims for retalia-
tory demotion/discharge because § 1983 provides 
him with an adequate, alternative remedy. The 
court determines, however, that use of the word 
"preemption" in this context is somewhat con-
fusing. See, e.g., Flenker v. Willamette Indus., 
Inc., 266 Kan. 198, 967 P.2d 295, 299 (Kan. 
1998) ("The question to ask in resolving recogni-
tion of a state tort claim for retaliatory discharge 
is whether the statutory remedy is adequate and 
Page 3 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3583, *7 
thus precludes the common-law remedy."); Equal 
Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Int'l Paper 
Co., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18895, *17, No. 91-
2017-L, 1992 WL 370850, at *6 (D. Kan. Oct. 
28, 1992) (declining to entertain defendant's ar-
gument that plaintiff's state law claims are barred 
due to the presence of an available federal remedy 
where pretrial order "discusses preemption, not 
adequate alternative remedies" and the "two doc-
trines are significantly different"); but cf. King 
v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, 1993 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6017, *2, No. 92-2414-EEO, 1993 WL 
141868, at *1 (D. Kan. Apr. 23, 1993) (holding 
that plaintiff's state law claim for retaliatory dis-
charge is "preempted" by her § 1983 claim); Groh 
v. City of Lenexa, Kan., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
6074, *12, No. 90-2073-V, 1991 WL 79662, at 
*4 (D. Kan. Apr. 16, 1991) (holding same). For 
this reason, the court uses the word "precluded." 
[*8] 
The general rule in Kansas is at-will employment, mean-
ing "in the absence of a contract, expressed or implied, 
between an employee and his employer covering the du-
ration of employment, the employment is terminable at 
the will of either party." Flenker v. Willamette Indus., 
Inc., 266 Kan. 198, 967 P.2d 295, 298 (Kan. 1998) 
(quoting Johnston v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 
218 Kan. 543, 545 P.2d 312, 315 (Kan. 1976)). Kansas 
courts, however, have recognized certain public pol-
icy exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine. See 
id. One such exception is commonly referred to as the 
"whistle-blower" exception. This exception makes it un-
lawful for an employer to demote or terminate an em-
ployee in retaliation for his good faith reporting of a 
co-worker's or employer's serious infraction of rules, 
regulations, or laws pertaining to public health, safety, 
and the general welfare to either company management 
or law enforcement officials. See Brigham, 935 P.2d at 
1059-60; Palmer, 752 P.2d at 689-90. 
Plaintiff's allegations in his complaint appear to state a 
valid claim for retaliatory demotion/discharge based [*9] 
upon the whistle-blowing exception, because Plaintiff 
alleges that Defendants unlawfully demoted him and 
terminated his employment (by constructively discharg-
ing him) in retaliation for his good faith reporting 
of Defendant Major's alleged misuse of the federally 
funded MOCIC telecommunication system—a system 
designed to assist law enforcement officials in fight-
ing crime. Kansas courts, however, will not recognize 
a claim based upon a public policy exception to the at-
will employment doctrine where a state or federal statute 
provides an adequate, alternative remedy. See Flenker, 
967 P.2d at 299 (citing Bair v. Peck, 248 Kan. 824, 811 
P.2d 1176, 1187-88 (Kan. 1991); Masters v. Daniel, 
Int'l Corp., 917 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1990)). Thus, 
" 'in order to succeed on a claim for retaliatory discharge 
under Kansas law, a plaintiff must show not only that 
[he] was discharged in contravention of public policy, 
but also that [he] has no alternative remedy under state 
or federal law.'" Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 906 F. 
Supp. 606, 615 (D. Kan. 1995) (quoting Braun v. Dillon 
Cos., Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6117, *30, No. 94-
2079-EEO, 1995 WL 261142, [*10] at *10 (D. Kan. 
Apr. 19, 1995)). Plaintiff is unable to do this; Plaintiff 
is unable to show that he has no other adequate, alterna-
tive remedy under federal law. Plaintiff brings a claim 
pursuant to § 1983 based upon the very same factual 
allegations as his whistle-blowing claim. Plaintiff does 
not contest that § 1983 provides him with an alterna-
tive vehicle for pursuing a claim against Defendants for 
retaliatory demotion/discharge based upon his report-
ing of Defendant Major's alleged misuse of the MOCIC 
telecommunication system. Nor does he contest that § 
1983 provides him with an adequate remedy. Instead, he 
simply argues that the adequate alternative doctrine does 
not apply to the facts of this case. Plaintiff argues that 
the adequate alternative doctrine applies only where the 
court is faced with a decision of whether to recognize a 
new public policy exception to the at-will employment 
doctrine, and not where, as here, the court is faced with 
a decision of whether to recognize an already existing 
public policy exception. The court rejects Plaintiff's ar-
gument. The public policy exception based upon whis-
tle-blowing was first announced by the Kansas Supreme 
Court in 1988 in [*11] Palmer v. Brown, 242 Kan. 893, 
752P.2d685(Kan. 1988). Since that decision, numerous 
courts have precluded whistle-blowing claims pursuant 
to the adequate alternative doctrine where the plaintiff 
has had an alternative cause of action under § 1983. See, 
e.g., Merkel v. Leavenworth County Emergency Med. 
Servs., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 975, *40-41, 98-2335-
JWL, 2000 WL 127266, at *12 (D. Kan. Jan. 4, 2000) 
(precluding plaintiff's retaliatory discharge claim based 
upon whistle-blowing where § 1983 "clearly provides 
an alternative vehicle for plaintiff to pursue any injuries 
stemming from his alleged retaliatory discharge"); King 
v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
6017, No. 92-2414-EEO, 1993 WL 141868, at *1 (D. 
Kan. Apr. 23, 1993) (same); Groh v. City of Lenexa, 
Kan., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6074, No. 90-2073-V, 
1991 WL 79662, at *4 (D. Kan. Apr. 16, 1991) (same). 
The court concludes that § 1983 provides Plaintiff with 
an adequate, alternative remedy to his claim for retal-
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iatory demotion/discharge based upon whistle-blowing 
and, therefore, Plaintiff is precluded from pursuing 
Counts III and IV of his complaint. 
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
In Count V of his [*12] complaint, Plaintiff brings 
a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed be-
cause the underlying allegations are insufficient to state 
a claim as a matter of law. The court agrees. 
Kansas recognizes the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. See Moore v. State Bank of Burden, 
240 Kan. 382, 729 P.2d 1205, 1211 (Kan. 1986). Under 
this tort, "one who by extreme and outrageous conduct 
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional dis-
tress to another may be liable for such emotional dis-
tress." Id. To state a claim against Defendants, Plaintiff 
must allege that (1) Defendants' conduct was intentional 
or in reckless disregard of Plaintiff, (2) Defendants' con-
duct was extreme and outrageous, (3) a causal connec-
tion existed between Defendants' conduct and Plaintiff's 
mental distress, and (4) Plaintiff's mental distress was 
extreme and severe. See Nwakpuda v. Falley's, Inc., 14 
F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1218 (D. Kan. 1998) (citing Roberts 
v. Saylor, 230 Kan. 289, 637 P.2d 1175, 1179 (Kan. 
1981)). In addition, Plaintiff must meet two thresh-
old requirements: [*13] Plaintiff must convince the 
court that reasonable fact finders might conclude that (1) 
Defendants' conduct was sufficiently extreme and out-
rageous as to permit recovery, and (2) Plaintiff's emo-
tional distress suffered as a result of Defendants' con-
duct was so extreme and severe that no reasonable person 
should be expected to endure it. See Nwakpuda, 14 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1218 (citing Roberts, 637 P.2d at 1180). 
Conduct is considered extreme and outrageous if it is 
"beyond the bounds of decency and utterly intolerable 
in a civilized society." Moore, 729 P.2d at 1211 (cit-
ing Neufeldt v. L.R. Foy Constr. Co., 236 Kan. 664, 
693 R2d 1194, 1198 (Kan. 1985)). Courts will dismiss 
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) when "all the elements are not 
alleged or when the alleged conduct does not amount to 
extreme and outrageous under state law." Gudenkauf v. 
Stauffer Communications, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 461, 464-
65 (D. Kan. 1996) (citing West v. Boeing Co., 843 F. 
Supp. 670, 677-79 (D. Kan. 1994); Moten v. Am. Linen 
Supply Co., 155 F.R.D. 202, 205 (D. Kan. 1994); [*14] 
Boisjoly v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 795, 
801 (D. Utah 1988)). 
Plaintiff has failed to allege conduct that is sufficiently 
extreme and outrageous to permit recovery under Kansas 
law. Plaintiff alleges that, in an effort to punish him 
for reporting Defendant Major's alleged misuse of the 
MOCIC telecommunication system, Defendants (1) ini-
tiated an Internal Affairs Investigation against him, 
(2) placed him on administrative leave, (3) improperly 
searched his desk, (4) required him to attend employee 
counseling, (5) demoted him to a new position which 
gave him less important responsibilities and effectively 
isolated him from contact with his peers, (6) sustained 
most of the violations alleged against him in the Internal 
Affairs Investigation, (7) suspended him without pay 
for four weeks, (8) placed him on disciplinary proba-
tion for one year, and (9) forced him to retire early. 
Such allegations do not rise to the level of extreme-
ness and outrageousness necessary to permit recovery. 
Courts are very reluctant to extend the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress to the employ-
ment context. See West, 843 F. Supp. at 678 (citing 
[*15] Laughinghouse v. Risser, 754 F. Supp. 836, 843 
(D. Kan. 1990)). "Employment discrimination by itself, 
without aggravating factors like ethnic slurs and physical 
threats, does 'not amount to outrage.'" Gudenkauf, 922 
F. Supp. at 464 (citing Rupp v. Purolator Courier Corp., 
790 F. Supp. 1069, 1073 (D. Kan. 1992) (further citation 
omitted)). The court determines that the conduct alleged 
cannot be considered "beyond the bounds of decency 
and utterly intolerable in a civilized society." Moore, 
729 P.2d at 1211. Instead, it is more akin to "'ordinary 
business decisions . . . made every day by employers 
across the nation.*" Moten, 155 F.R.D at 205 (quoting 
Anspach v. Tomkins Indus., Inc., 817 F. Supp. 1499, 
1508 (D. Kan. 1993)). 
IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED 
that Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 35) is granted; 
Counts III, IV, and V of Plaintiffs complaint are dis-
missed. 
Copies of this order shall be mailed to counsel of record 
for the parties. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated at Kansas City, Kansas, this 21st day of 
February 2001. 
G. Thomas VanBebber 
United [*16] States Senior District Judge 
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1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 599 
January 15, 
NOTICE: 
PUB-STATUS: *1 RULES OF THE TENTH CIR-
CUIT COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT CITA-
TION TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE RE-
FER TO THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT. 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Reported in Table Case 
Format at: 106 F.3d 413, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 
25879. 
PRIOR HISTORY: (Western District of Oklahoma). 
(D.C. No. CIV-94-668-M). 
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED. 
CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff former employee 
sought review of judgments entered by the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Ok-
lahoma in favor of defendants, former employer and 
former supervisor, on a complaint of retaliatory dis-
charge and discrimination in violation of the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 
12101-12213, and tortious interference with employ-
ment relationship. 
OVERVIEW: The employee took a leave of absence 
after undergoing surgery. After a physician deter-
mined he was permanently partially disabled, the em-
ployee's supervisor refused to let him to return to 
work. The employee was terminated during a sec-
ond leave of absence. The employee filed suit against 
the employer and the supervisor for retaliatory dis-
charge and discrimination in violation of the ADA and 
against the supervisor for tortious interference with 
employment relationship. The court granted summary 
judgment for defendants on all but the retaliatory dis-
charge claim against the employer. A jury found for 
the employer. On appeal, the court affirmed the judg-
ments. The court held that there was no contract of 
employment to support a tortious interference claim. 
The court noted that the employee claimed that he was 
impaired in his capacity to work but never identified 
a class of jobs that he could not perform. The em-
ployee also did not present evidence that his employer 
regarded him as having a physical impairment that pre-
vented him from performing a class of jobs. The su-
pervisor was not liable under the ADA because he was 
1997, Filed 
not the employer. 
OUTCOME: The court affirmed summary judgment 
for defendants and the judgment for the employer en-
tered on a jury verdict. 
CORE TERMS: impairment, disability, disabled, re-
taliatory discharge, summary judgment, impaired, shoul-
der, workers' compensation, Disabilities Act, tortious 
interference, correctly, route, employment relation-
ship, mental impairment, supervisor, training, abuse 
of discretion, leave of absence, effective date, termi-
nation, terminated, surgery, rehire, rating, pain 
LexisNexis(TM) Headnotes 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Dis-
ability Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions 
Pensions & Benefits Law > Americans With Disabil-
ities Act> Prohibited Employment Discrimination 
Constitutional Law > Civil Rights Enforcement > Amer-
icans With Disabilities Act > Coverage 
HNlThe Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) pro-
hibits discrimination against disabled individuals. A 
disability under the ADA is defined as: (A) a physical 
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more of the major life activities of such individual; 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being re-
garded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C.S. § 
12102(2). 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Dis-
ability Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions 
Constitutional Law > Civil Rights Enforcement > Amer-
icans With Disabilities Act> Coverage 
Workers' Compensation & SSDI> Remedies Under 
Other Statutes > Americans With Disabilities Act 
HN242 U.S.C.S. § 12102(2)(A) requires an actual 
physical impairment that substantially limits a major 
life activity. Work constitutes a major life activity, 
but to qualify as disabled under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, the impairment must significantly re-
strict the individual from performing a class of jobs or 
a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to 
the average person having comparable training, skills 
and abilities. The inability to perform one particular 
job is not necessarily sufficient. 
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Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Dis-
ability Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions 
Constitutional Law > Civil Rights Enforcement > Amer-
icans With Disabilities Act > Coverage 
Workers' Compensation & SSDI> Remedies Under 
Other Statutes > Americans With Disabilities Act 
HN3Under subsection 42 U.S.C.S. § 12102(2)(C), a 
person is disabled if he or she is "regarded as having," 
§ 12102(2)(C), a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of the major life ac-
tivities of such individual, § 12102(2)(A), regardless 
of whether he or she actually has such an impairment. 
The difference from the subsection (A) claim is that 
the focus shifts from the individual's actual physical or 
mental condition to the employer or others' perception 
of the individual's impairment. While the employee 
need not have actually suffered any impairment, the 
impairment perceived to exist by others must still be 
shown to be one that substantially limits a major life 
activity. 
Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Disability 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Dis-
ability Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions 
Pensions & Benefits Law > Americans With Disabil-
ities Act> Qualified Individuals With a Disability 
HN4Just as a claim of actual disability under 42 
U.S.C.S. § 12102(A) must show a specific class of 
jobs or a broad range of jobs from which the plaintiff 
is excluded, a claim of perceived disability must show 
a class of jobs or broad range of jobs from which the 
plaintiff is perceived to be precluded. 
Workers' Compensation & SSDI> Coverage> Ac-
tions Against Employers > Statutory Requirements 
HN5An individual is not liable under the Oklahoma 
Workers' Compensation Act unless he or she actually 
employed the plaintiff. 
Torts > Business & Employment Torts > Interference 
With a Contract 
HN6A claim of tortious interference with employ-
ment relationship requires "the existence of a valid, 
enforceable contract." 
COUNSEL: For MARTIN EDWARD MILATZ, Plain-
tiff - Appellant: Marilyn D. Barringer, Oklahoma City, 
OK. 
For FRITO-LAY, INC., a Division of Pepsi Co., Inc., 
TERRY L. KELLY, individually and in his manage-
rial capacity, Defendants - Appellees: Katie J. Colopy, 
Matthew W. Ray, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Dallas, 
TX. 
JUDGES: Before BALDOCK, McWILLIAMS and RONEY, 
** Circuit Judges. 
** The Honorable Paul H. Roney, Senior 
Circuit Judge for the Eleventh Circuit, sit-
ting by designation. 
OPINIONBY: PAUL H. RONEY 
OPINION: ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 
Footnotes 
* This order and judgment is not binding 
precedent, except under the doctrines of 
law of the case, res judicata and collateral 
estoppel. The court generally disfavors the 
citation of orders and judgments; neverthe-
less, an order and judgment may be cited 
under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. 
R. 36.3. 
End Footnotes 
*2 
Martin Milatz sued his former employer, Frito-Lay, 
Inc., and supervisor, Terry Kelly, alleging retaliatory 
discharge and discrimination in violation of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S. C. §§ 12101-
12213, by Frito-Lay and Kelly, and tortious inter-
ference with employment relationship by Kelly. The 
district court entered summary judgment for all de-
fendants except as to the retaliatory discharge claim, 
which was tried against Frito-Lay and was resolved 
by a verdict for the defendant. Plaintiff appeals. We 
affirm. 
ADA Discrimination Claim 
We affirm summary judgment for defendants on the 
Americans with Disabilities Act claim because the dis-
trict court correctly determined that plaintiff did not 
present sufficient facts to establish a disability under 
the statute. The district court correctly focused on 
only those events that occurred after the July 26, 1996 
effective date of the Act. Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 104-336, § 108, 1991 
U.S.CC.A.N. (104 Stat.) 337. 
HNlThe ADA prohibits discrimination against dis-
abled individuals. A disability under the ADA is de-
fined as (A) a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or *3 more of the major life 
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an 
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an 
impairment. 42 US.C. § 12102(2). Milatz's primary 
focus on appeal is his subsection (C) claim that he was 
"regarded as having" an impairment. 
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Milatz alleged that Frito-Lay discriminated against him 
by failing to rehire him to his route sales position due 
to a real or perceived limitation on his ability to use his 
wrist or shoulder. Terry Kelly was Milatz's supervisor 
at the time these acts occurred. 
Milatz was a route salesman for Frito-Lay from 1986 
until his termination in June 1992. In January 1992, 
Milatz developed numbness in his left hand and pain 
in his left shoulder. He underwent carpal tunnel re-
lease surgery in March 1992, followed by a leave of 
absence. Following his return to work, Milatz was ex-
amined by Frito-Lay's rating physician who found him 
permanently partially disabled. Milatz alleges that af-
ter he admitted that his shoulder pain continued, Kelly 
refused to allow him to return to his job because he 
was not 100 percent. 
Milatz took a second leave of absence during which 
he was terminated. Although Milatz raises claims of 
ADA discrimination *4 in the events that led to his 
termination in June 1992, the district court correctly 
disregarded these claims because they fell before the 
July 26, 1992, effective date of the Act. 
In May 1993, approximately one year later and after 
the ADA was in effect, Milatz informed Frito-Lay that 
he had recovered and was ready to return to his job. 
Milatz had undergone shoulder surgery in November 
1992 and had obtained a work release from his physi-
cian effective June 1, 1993, with the single restriction 
of no overhead lifting. Frito-Lay informed Milatz that 
he had been terminated for job abandonment in 1992 
and did not offer to rehire Milatz to his old job. 
Milatz filed an EEOC claim in January 1994, was is-
sued a notice of right to sue in May 1994, and filed this 
action. Frito-Lay and Kelly were awarded summary 
judgment on the ground that Milatz was not disabled 
under the ADA. 
Milatz has never raised a serious issue that he was actu-
ally disabled under subsection (A) of the ADA disabil-
ity definition or that he had a record of impairment 
under subsection (B). HN2Subsection (A) requires 
an actual physical impairment that substantially limits 
a major life activity. Milatz presents evidence related 
*5 to impairment only in the major life activity cat-
egory of work. Work constitutes a major life activity, 
but to qualify as ADA disabled, the impairment must 
significantly restrict the individual from performing "a 
class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes 
as compared to the average person having comparable 
training, skills and abilities." Bolton v Scrivner, Inc., 
36 E3d 939, 942 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing 29 C.ER. 
§ 1630.2(i)), cert, denied, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1071, 115 
S. Ct. 1104 (1995). The inability to perform one 
particular job is not necessarily sufficient. Id. (citing 
Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 E2d 1415 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(interpreting equivalent provision of the Rehabilitation 
Act)). 
Milatz's evidence focuses only on the degree to which 
he is physically impaired, rather than any specific class 
or range of jobs from which he is excluded. While fo-
cusing on work as the major life activity for which he 
is impaired, Milatz does not identify a single job he 
cannot perform. We have previously held such evi-
dence insufficient as a matter of law under subsection 
(A). Bolton, 36 E3d at 944 (noting that the plaintiffs 
evidence failed to address any vocational training, the 
*6 geographical area to which he had access, or the 
number and type of jobs demanding similar training 
for which the plaintiff would also be qualified). 
While the district court order does not address sub-
section (B), the record indicates that Milatz's failure 
to establish a claim under the "record of impairment" 
theory was before the district court and that Milatz has 
not presented a material issue of fact under this theory 
either. Milatz's injury and worker's compensation rat-
ing were insufficient to establish disability under sub-
section (A), and Frito-Lay's awareness of these same 
facts does not establish a "record of impairment" under 
subsection (B). 
HN3Under subsection (C), a person is disabled if he 
is "regarded as having," § 12102(2)(C), "a physical 
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more of the major life activities of such individual," 
§ 12102(2)(A), regardless of whether he actually has 
such an impairment. See MacDonald v. Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., 94 E3d 1437, 1443 (10th Cir. 1996). 
The difference from the subsection (A) claim is that 
the focus shifts from the individual's actual physical 
or mental condition to the employer or others' per-
ception of the *7 individual's impairment. While 
the employee need not have actually suffered any im-
pairment, the impairment perceived to exist by others 
must still be shown to be one that substantially limits 
a major life activity. Id. 
Milatz's subsection (C) claim exhibits a deficiency 
similar to his claim under subsection (A). He offers 
evidence only that Frito-Lay may have perceived him 
to be too impaired to perform the sales route job, not 
evidence that Frito-Lay perceived him impaired in a 
class of jobs or broad range of jobs in various classes. 
HN4Just as a claim of actual disability under subsec-
tion (A) must show a specific class of jobs or a broad 
range of jobs from which the plaintiff is excluded, a 
claim of perceived disability must show a class of jobs 
or broad range of jobs from which the plaintiff is per-
ceived to be precluded. See Taylor v. Albertsons, Inc., 
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 390, 1996 WL 10931 at ** 2 
(10th Cir. 1996) (unpublished, disposition reported at 
74 E3d 1250) ("For employee's claim to have merit 
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. . . she must show that employer regarded her 
disabled for more than a single job."). Further, the 
misperception alleged here does not raise the specter 
of what *8 appears to be the primary target of subsec-
tion (C)--discrimination based upon invidious stereo-
types. See\hndeZandev. WisconsinDep'tofAdmin., 
44 E3d 538, 541 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing preamble to 
ADA, 42 f/.S.C. % 12101). 
Retaliatory Discharge Claim Against Kelly 
We affirm summary judgment for Kelly on the retal-
iatory discharge claim because he was not a proper 
party. HN5An individual is not liable under the Ok-
lahoma Workers' Compensation Act unless he actually 
employed the plaintiff. Proctor v. Caudill, 820 P. 2d 
1353, 1356 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991). 
Tortious Interference Claim Against Kelly 
We affirm summary judgment for Kelly on the tortious 
interference claim because there was no contract of 
employment, Milatz at all times being an employee-
at-will. HN6A claim of tortious interference with 
employment relationship requires "the existence of a 
valid, enforceable contract." Tatum v. Philip Morris, 
Inc., 809 F. Supp. 1452, 1468 (W.D. Okla. 1992), 
ajf'd, 16 E3d 417 (10th Cir. 1993), cert, denied, 128 
L. Ed. 2d 461, 114 S. Ct. 1833 (1994). 
Retaliatory Discharge Claim Against Frito-Lay 
We affirm the judgment for Frito-Lay on the retalia-
tory discharge claim, *9 entered after a jury verdict, 
finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's pre-
trial and evidentiary rulings. 
The motion for leave to amend the complaint was filed 
approximately six weeks after the established deadline 
to add claims of questionable validity. The record does 
not reflect any abuse of discretion in denying leave to 
amend, taking into consideration the relevant factors: 
justification for delay, prejudice to the opposing party, 
and futility of the proposed amendment. Castleglen, 
Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 984E2d 1571, 1584-
85 (10th Cir. 1993). 
The case proceeded to trial on Milatz's claim for retal-
iatory discharge against Frito-Lay only after the dis-
trict court denied Milatz leave to amend his complaint. 
At trial, the court refused to allow an expert, proffered 
by Milatz, to testify on the procedures, intricacies, 
and history of the workers' compensation system and 
his personal involvement with Milatz's workers' com-
pensation proceedings. Reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard, Werth v. Makita Elec. Works, 
Ltd., 950 E2d 643, 647 (10th Cir. 1991), there was 
no error in excluding this testimony on the ground it 
was irrelevant to *10 the controlling issue: whether 
Milatz's discharge was motivated by his engaging in 
the concededly protected activity of filing a workers' 
compensation claim. 
AFFIRMED. 
Entered for the Court 
Paul H. Roney 
Senior Circuit Judge 
